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Public opinion, the Leopold Report, and the re-
form of federal predator control policy
JAMES W. FELDMAN, University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, Environmental Studies Program, 800 
Algoma Boulevard, Oshkosh, WI 54901, USA   feldmanj@uwosh.edu
Abstract: This paper explores the role of public opinion in a landmark shift in the federal predator 
control program. In 1963, the Leopold Committee recommended extensive reform in the federal 
predator control program, predicting that growing public support for the environmental movement 
would force such a move if the government did not initiate a change. In the years following the publication 
of the Leopold Report, the U.S. Division of Wildlife Services reformed its predator control program and 
tried to improve its public image. Meanwhile, both environmentalists and ranchers fought to control 
public opinion about the issue. The 1972 ban on predacides (poisons for predators) in federal predator 
control programs resulted as much from the environmentalists’ ability to control public opinion as from 
the changing scientifi c understanding of predators.
Key words: Compound 1080, environmental movement, human–wildlife confl ict, Jack H. Berryman, 
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Americans view coyotes (Canis latrans) 
in at least 2 diff erent ways. One perspective 
romanticizes the coyote: “If I could, I would 
go to bed every night with coyote voices in 
my ears and with them greet the gray light of 
every dawn,” intones 1 nature writer (Olsen 
1971a:256). The coyote’s haunting moon-howl 
symbolizes the wilderness to campers in 
America’s backcountry. Ranchers and farmers 
who make their living off  livestock, on the other 
hand, view the coyote as a threat to economic 
stability. In 1 rancher’s words: “[There is] 
nothing romantic about a bunch of lambs with 
their throats ripped out” (Spangler 1991:5). 
For the fi rst half of the twentieth century, this 
latt er view determined animal damage control 
policies in the United States for coyotes and 
other predatory animals. Federal agents 
and ranchers used many techniques to stop 
predators from preying on livestock, including 
the liberal use of poisons in an eff ort to suppress 
predator populations across broad areas. Over 
the course of the century, a growing ecological 
understanding of predators raised questions 
about this policy. The 1964 publication of 
the U.S. Department of the Interior’s report, 
Predator and Rodent Control in the United States, 
more commonly known as the Leopold Report, 
marked a turning point in the federal policy on 
predator control (Leopold et al. 1964). It was a 
batt le over public perception, however, and not 
just a changing understanding of ecology, that 
motivated drastic change in federal policy.
Establishing the federal predator
 control program
The federal government fi rst became 
involved in predator control in the early 
twentieth century, and the program grew 
quickly. The initial government role included 
only conducting studies and demonstrations 
of predator control tools and techniques. The 
livestock industry, however, increasingly 
demanded a larger federal program, and 
Congress responded to this pressure in 1915 
by allocating $125,000 specifi cally for predator 
control to the U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey 
(BBS), an agency housed in the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, to deal with predatory animals 
that preyed on livestock (Di Silvestro 1985, 
Hawthorne et al. 1999). Initial predator control 
had relied on hunting and trapping, but the 
BBS introduced poisons as an additional 
method. With a large amount of rangeland to 
cover, bait stations—horse quarters laced with 
strychnine and set out for scavenging wolves 
(Canis lupus) and coyotes to fi nd—proved an 
eff ective technique. Traps caught only 1 animal 
at a time; poisons killed multiple predators that 
consumed poisoned bait at the stations. In 1920, 
the BBS began systematic experimentation 
to improve the eff ectiveness of poisons as a 
control tool (Hawthorne et al. 1999). By the 
mid-1920s, the federal program supported 
the killing of approximately 35,000 coyotes a 
year. The Great Depression increased pressure 
for more extensive control, and World War II 
rationing on steel and ammunition hastened 
the shift  from trapping and hunting to the use 
of poisons (Dunlap 1988, Mighett o 1991).
Rationale for predator control grew out 
of the ideas of Progressive Era conservation. 
Environmental historians have developed a 
very specifi c meaning of the term progressive 
conservation. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century, Americans began to manage—as 
opposed to simply use—their natural resources. 
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The overarching ideology of conservation 
was the application of scientifi c principles to 
resource management to ensure continued 
yield of resources like timber, minerals, and 
livestock. Samuel Hays, the leading historian 
of the conservation movement, identifi ed “the 
concept of planned and effi  cient progress” as 
the heart of the conservation idea (Hays 1959:5). 
In my article, the term conservation is used in 
this historical sense. Proponents of conservation 
science sought to replace the view of the 
environment as an opponent to be conquered 
that had guided early American encounters 
with the natural world. Killing predators was 
easily justifi ed as a means for maximizing both 
rangeland and wildlife resources (Nash 1982, 
Worster 1985).
The application of Progressive conservation 
principles to wildlife produced the science of 
game management and early applications of 
the new science further depreciated the value 
of predators. Wildlife conservation focused on 
game species as a resource, and predators killed 
deer (Odocoileus spp.) and pronghorn antelope 
(Antilocapra americana), as well as domestic 
livestock. The increasingly powerful  sports-
man’s clubs threw in their lot with ranchers 
in calls for predator control. A young U.S. 
Forest Service employee named Aldo Leopold 
emerged as one of the leading  theoreticians 
of  the new science of wildlife management. 
Leopold had long been a proponent of 
predator control. In 1920, he had called for the 
extermination of wolves and mountain lions 
(Felis concolor) throughout the West. Later in the 
century, Leopold’s ideas about wildlife manage-
ment and predator control altered drastically. 
Leopold’s transforming att itude toward 
predators serve as a signpost for changes in 
American att itudes in general (Worster 1985, 
Dunlap 1988, Leopold 1990, Mighett o 1991). 
In the early twentieth century, though, federal 
predator control had both political and scientifi c 
support.
The use of predacides (poisons for predators) 
sparked protests against the predator control 
program. In 1923, some scientists voiced 
the fi rst signifi cant criticism against the BBS, 
decrying what they label as “modern poison 
warfare”(Worster 1985) without research into 
the environmental consequences of poison use. 
These scientists worried about nontarget kills, 
meaning fatalities, to American badgers (Taxidea 
taxus), striped skunks (Mephitis mephitis), bald 
eagles (Haliaeetus leucocephalus), golden eagles 
(Aguila chrysaetos), and other animals that fed at 
the bait stations that were set out to kill coyotes 
and wolves. These objections escalated in 1930, 
when the BBS requested $1 million for predator 
control (MacIntyre 1982).
The Great Depression quashed these 
protests, and between 1930 and 1950 the 
federal commitment to predator control 
steadily increased. In 1931, Congress passed 
the National Animal Damage Control Act, 
legislation directing the government to 
“conduct campaigns for the destruction or 
control of (predatory) animals” (U.S. Public 
Law 776). This act expanded the government 
role in predator control, authorizing the use of 
federal funds and personnel on private lands. 
The act remains a key foundation for modern 
animal damage control eff orts (Di Silvestro 
1985). During 1934, Congress assessed fees for 
grazing on public lands, solidifying the federal 
responsibility to control predators. In 1939, the 
predator control program—now carried out by 
the Division of Predator and Rodent Control 
(PARC)—moved to the U.S. Department of 
the Interior. This division enjoyed consistent 
support both in Washington and on the western 
range, demonstrated by its budget of more 
than $1 million cooperatively provided by the 
government and by western livestock interests 
(Cain et al. 1972, MacIntyre 1982). Numbers of 
coyotes taken by the federal program reached 
all-time highs during World War II, topping 
out at 111,076 recorded in 1942 (Cain et al. 
1972). Other large predators—such as wolves, 
mountain lions, and grizzly bears (Ursus 
arctos)—had been banished to the most isolated 
parts of the West or extirpated altogether. 
During this era, the federal animal damage 
control program expanded in relative obscurity, 
with litt le formal opposition or public notice 
(Miller 1999).
In 1947, PARC introduced a new predacide—
sodium fl uoroacetate, or Compound 1080 
for short. Compound 1080 off ered many 
advantages. A colorless, tasteless, odorless 
poison, it proved highly toxic to canids and 
Coyote on the prowl.
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Wool grower involvement in predator policies 
coincided with a wider suspicion that ranching 
interests had subjected the entire grazing 
system to their will. As federal predator control 
became more controversial, opponents of the 
program pointed to the ranchers’ infl uence as 
one of the system’s gravest problems (Culhane 
1981, Brunson and Kennedy 1995).
The increasing role of the federal government 
in predator control became controversial, as 
well. Traditionally, state wildlife agencies 
managed resident wildlife, whereas the 
responsibility for migratory animals fell to the 
federal government. Under which class did 
coyotes fall? People encouraging an increased 
federal role claimed that coyotes moved 
across state borders and therefore constituted 
migratory wildlife. Those opposed to federal 
involvement argued that coyotes’ territorial 
nature made them resident wildlife and a state 
responsibility. Others believed that predators 
kept ranchers from using federal land for 
grazing, thereby reducing the value of public 
lands and threatening rural economies. Another 
dispute focused on the benefi ciaries of control: 
state management brought the most eff ective 
response to local needs, but wildlife belonged 
to the general public as public resources, not 
just to the local community. These questions 
concerned federal wildlife management in 
general, not just predator policies (Cummings 
1972, U.S. Congress 1972, Wagner 1972, Wagner 
1975).
The ambiguous nature of wildlife responsi-
bility has been a persistent issue in the history 
of predator control. All of the groups interested 
in control—ranchers, conservationists, federal 
agents, and scientists—have exploited the 
uncertainty, moving toward or away from 
increased federal control depending on specifi c 
situations and desired goals. The lasting eff ect 
of the state/federal dilemma has been to keep 
the door to controversy ajar. This uncertainty 
also ensured that public opinion about the role 
of predator control would become increasingly 
important (Bean 1978, Tober 1981, Tober 1989).
On the practical level, the various federal 
agencies that have carried out predator control 
have dealt with the responsibility dilemma by 
negotiating cooperative agreements with the 
states (Cain et al. 1972). The head of the federal 
program, Jack H. Berryman, summed up the 
debate in 1970:
Our relationship with the States goes 
beyond the rather simplistic and arbitrary 
migratory-resident species concept (which 
we all ignore most of the time anyway) 
and the present states’ rights commotion. 
rodents, the two chief targets of control. A mere 
1.6 grams of the poison rendered 100 pounds of 
horsemeat lethal to coyotes. This new predacide 
quickly became PARC’s preferred control tool. 
But Compound 1080 also drew immediate and 
constant criticism from opponents of predator 
control for its dangers to humans (there is no 
known antidote), for the inhumanity of the 
convulsions it induced in animals, and for its 
possible dangers to the environment (Howard 
and Schmidt 1984, Dunlap 1988).
Because of the risks associated with 
Compound 1080, PARC implemented strict 
restrictions on the new poison. These included: 
use only in the sparsely populated West; use 
only where predation posed a major problem 
and other methods had failed; use only in bait 
stations and only 1 station per 93.2 km2; and 
placement of bait stations away from roads, 
developments, and water sources (Dunlap 
1988). Some scholars have suggested that the 
scientists who fi rst researched Compound 1080 
widely publicized the toxin’s risks to scare 
untrained people from using it, as no eff ective 
regulatory system existed at the time. Later 
critics of the poison called upon this publicity 
in their campaign to limit its use (Howard and 
Schmidt 1984).
During the fi rst half of the twentieth century, 
federal predator control operations expanded 
gradually. One interpretation of the growth of 
this program holds that the western ranching 
interests dominated PARC and that predator 
control depended on ranchers’ whims rather than 
objective decision making. The establishment 
of cooperative funding mechanisms—money 
from states, counties, and local ranching 
associations directly paid to PARC for its 
services—aided this development. In 1940, for 
example, the federal government contributed 
only $398,360 for PARC’s predator control 
activities, whereas cooperative funds totaled 
$632,115 (Cain et al. 1972). This cooperation 
also developed from the positions of western 
representatives on powerful U.S. congressional 
committ ees, the high demand for meat during 
World War II, and the absence of consistent 
opposition to predator control (MacIntyre 1982). 
A 
coyote 
fi nds 
its 
victim.
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The animal control eff ort is a kind of 
partnership, although we do indeed need 
to enjoy active and open support when 
rendering services needed and requested 
by the States. If this is not the case, we 
should pull out entirely... (J. H. Berryman, 
Division of Wildlife Services, unpublished 
report 1970).
Through these agreements, the government 
secured authority to carry out its program, 
regardless of where actual responsibility fell.
Change in  American attitudes 
toward predators 
While the federal predator program grew, 
the att itudes of the American people toward 
wildlife and wild places changed. If predator 
policies prior to 1950 grew out of conservation, 
in the second half of the century they changed 
in response to the ideas of environmentalism. 
As with conservation, environmental 
historians consider the emergence of 
environmentalism as a specifi c historical 
event, albeit one less easily defi ned. 
Environmentalism fused several diff erent 
cultural trends into a new perspective 
on nature: the desire to preserve (as 
opposed to conserve) natural resources, 
increased interest in outdoor recreation, 
an ecological perspective on the 
relationships between humans and other 
organisms, and heightened att ention to 
the impact of pollution on the natural 
world.
Preservation demanded natural re-
source management not because of the 
economic opportunities in nature, but 
specifi cally because of nature’s non-economic 
values. This ideology had been around for a 
while, with philosophers like John Muir and 
batt les like the one in the early twentieth century 
over the Hetch Hetchy Dam outside of San 
Francisco. However, few people subscribed to 
these beliefs, and few of these beliefs translated 
into policy. But the economic boom of the 1950s 
provided room for att itudes to change. With 
fi nancial security came leisure time, disposable 
income, and ability to shed the dollar-dominated 
view of nature. Increasing calls by middle-class 
Americans for wilderness—lands protected 
from the degradations of resource extraction—
exemplify this shift  (Nash 1982, Dunlap 1988, 
Cawley 1993).
Aldo Leopold’s emerging ideas foreshadowed 
these changes. By the time of his death in 1948, 
Leopold had left  his earlier ideas of economic 
management behind and embraced what he 
termed a “land ethic.” This philosophy, he 
explained, “simply enlarges the boundaries 
of the community to include soils, waters, 
plants, and animals, or collectively the land.” 
Relationships with nature should be determined 
“in terms of what is ethically and aesthetically 
right, as well as what is economically expedient” 
(Leopold 1949:239). Scholars and activists 
consider Leopold one of the founders of modern 
environmentalism. Although not widely read 
in his own time, by the late 1960s Leopold had 
emerged as a prophet of the environmental 
movement with his 1949 collection of essays, A 
Sand County Almanac, as one of the movement’s 
most important texts (Worster 1985, Gray 
1993). 
Att itudes towards wildlife changed with 
wider shift s in the perceptions of the natural 
world. Predators—coyotes and especially 
wolves—served as symbols of the savage 
wilderness that early Americans had sought to 
tame. Progressive Era wildlife managers saw 
the predator in economic terms, as a threat to 
deer and livestock. In preservation ideology, 
however, the predator could be appreciated 
for the aesthetic qualities it brought to the 
environment and for its own inherent value. 
Aesthetic appreciation of coyotes and wolves 
developed around its moon-howl (Dunlap 1988, 
Mighett o 1991). “[The howl] is inextricably 
associated with the romance of the West, and 
the sense of open space and wildness of those 
areas,” explained 1 admirer (U.S. Congress 
1972:274). The bark of the coyote could be as 
valuable as its bite.
The developing science of ecology fostered 
transforming att itudes about wildlife and 
also about predator control. During the mid-
twentieth century, ecologists demonstrated with 
increasing confi dence the interrelationships 
and mutual dependence among all living 
things. The study of predation matured as well, 
Wolf pack.
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establishing the importance of predators in 
the biotic community. Opponents of predator 
control could and did argue that removing 
predators from the wild knocked the natural 
system into an unnatural state of imbalance 
(Nash 1982, Dunlap 1983, Worster 1985). 
Concern for animal rights and its less 
radical and more widely-supported sister 
idea, animal welfare, also matured during this 
time. Animal rights activists rallied around 
the idea that animals have moral standing, 
and they questioned the right of humans 
to infl ict pain on other animals. The animal 
welfare movement simply sought to reduce 
animal pain and avoid unnecessary suff ering 
(Schmidt 1990). Groups concerned with 
animal welfare formed around the turn of the 
nineteenth century; in 1925, the Anti-Steel 
Trap League began targeting the government’s 
predator program. As the government started 
to use more poison, animal welfare activists 
redirected their focus as well. Compound 1080, 
which att acked the coyote’s nervous system and 
induced violent convulsions, became a constant 
target of protests for its cruelty and inhumanity. 
Although animal rights activists did protest 
predator control, animal welfare generated 
more widespread concern (Mighett o 1991).
Changing perceptions of animals and 
wilderness contributed to growing rift s in the 
American social fabric. The controversy over 
what to do with predators frequently divided 
along East/West and rural/urban lines. The 
predator control dispute split the East and 
the West simply because most of the ranchers, 
sheep, and coyotes lived in the West and most 
of predator control’s opponents lived in the 
East. Westerners resented eastern intrusion, 
and they accused easterners of imperialism. 
Although the federal government—a frequent 
target of western unrest—provided the funding 
and manpower for predator management, the 
ranchers determined the frequency and intensity 
of control. In western eyes, regulation of the 
poisoning program would place unacceptable 
restrictions on range management.
The urban/rural split developed gradually 
during the twentieth century, but became 
more noticeable during the 1950s. During 
World War II, rural America experienced 
the beginnings of the production revolution. 
Expanding mechanization and the increasing 
use of pesticides decreased the number of 
people necessary for agricultural production. 
Young people migrated from the rural 
areas—particularly those with resource-based 
economies—to the cities. The rural exodus 
accelerated in the 1950s and 1960s. Whereas 
23% of Americans lived on farms in 1950, 
by 1970 less than 5% did. With decreasing 
population and defl ating morale, many rural 
American communities faltered (Brunson and 
Kennedy 1995, Danbom 1995). These changing 
demographics directly aff ected the sheep 
industry. As ranchers’ children left  for the cities, 
sheep operations folded across the West. In 
1950, 200,000 ranchers ran sheep; by 1972, the 
number had fallen to 59,700. Wool growers felt 
their way of life was dying out (Schueler 1991).
Conversely, urban America experienced 
unprecedented growth during the same 
period. With the economic boom of the 1950s, 
bank accounts and leisure time increased for 
many urbanites. Interest in outdoor recreation 
exploded as people sought relief from the 
dirty, congested cities. They looked to the less 
crowded, less developed rural areas to meet 
the demand. Urbanites spearheaded the new 
environmental movement, seeking what they 
perceived as an ecologically balanced, pristine 
wilderness and an outlet for their recreational 
interests (Hays 1987, Brunson and Kennedy 
1995).
These developments brought urban and rural 
America into confl ict. Urban recreationists’ 
outdoor activities “clashed frequently with 
the customs, economic objectives, and pace 
of life” of rural communities, explained 1 
scholar (Hays 1987:288). City dwellers brought 
their new set of environmental values to 
the countryside. Removed from the direct 
economic consequences of environmental 
regulation, they called for the preservation of 
wilderness areas and restrictions on ecologically 
destructive practices like pesticide application. 
Rural Americans consistently opposed these 
initiatives (Brunson and Kennedy 1995). 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring focused nation-
al att ention on the dangers of pesticides 
(Carson 1962). Many historians have pointed 
to the 1962 best seller as the fi rst step in the 
modern environmental movement. Carson’s 
book called att ention to concepts like the web 
of life and underlined the dangers of toxic 
substances in the environment. Concern about 
toxic pollutants emerged as a central theme 
of the environmental movement in the 1960s. 
While Carson publicized the plight of backyard 
songbirds, other authors focused on predators 
and wildlife. In 1963, Farley Mowat published 
Never Cry Wolf, a record of his observations of a 
Canadian wolf family (Mowat 1963). Although 
ecologists have disputed the scientifi c value and 
accuracy of Never Cry Wolf, the book became a 
best seller and helped to change many people’s 
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minds about the value of predators. Both of 
these books directed att ention once more to 
dangerous uses of pesticides, predacides, and 
other poisons, and also to the federal use of 
these tools in the predator control program 
(Dunlap 1983). 
Reforming predator control: 
the Leopold Report and its aftermath
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, protests 
against the predator control program picked up 
again. Some critics called only for a reassessment 
of the program; others questioned whether it 
was necessary at all. Changing att itudes toward 
wildlife and increasing calls for nature protection 
motivated these protests. In 1963, U.S. Secretary 
of the Interior Stewart Udall called for a review 
of the predator program to help answer the 
criticisms and to make recommendations for 
needed changes. The Special Advisory Board 
on Wildlife Management had been created in 
1962 to help the secretary administer the most 
diffi  cult wildlife management situations. The 
board consisted of 5 eminent wildlife biologists, 
and is usually known as the Leopold Committ ee, 
aft er chair A. Starker Leopold (Aldo Leopold’s 
son). The committ ee’s 1964 report on predator 
control, known as the Leopold Report, sparked 
a fl urry of changes in the federal predator 
control program (U.S. Congress 1966). Public 
perception of these changes proved to be just 
as important as the changes themselves.
The Leopold Report lambasted the existing 
federal control program. “It is the unanimous 
opinion of this Board that control as actually 
practiced is considerably in excess of the amount 
that can be justifi ed in terms of total public 
interest” (Leopold et al. 1964:3). The committ ee 
had studied all aspects of the PARC program: 
fi nancing, criteria for control, professionalism of 
federal agents, methodology, research agendas, 
public health, and predator, rodent, and bird 
control. The Leopold Committ ee scientists 
based their report on 2 basic premises: 
1) All native animals are resources of 
inherent interest and value to the people 
of the United States. Basic policy therefore 
should be one of husbandry of all forms of 
wildlife.
2) At the same time, local population control 
is an essential part of a management policy, 
where a species is causing signifi cant 
damage to other resources or crops, or 
where it endangers human health or 
safety. Control should be limited to the 
troublesome species, preferably to the 
troublesome individuals, and in any event 
to the localities where substantial damage 
or danger exists (Leopold et al. 1964:3).
These basic premises refl ect the principles of 
the 2 most important ideologies of twentieth-
century resource management: conservation 
and preservation. 
The scientists on the Leopold Committ ee 
off ered a set of recommendations to improve the 
federal program. They suggested a permanent 
advisory board made up of representatives 
of all parties interested in control to oversee 
the program. They called for a reassessment 
by PARC of its own goals in light of the 
American public’s changing att itudes toward 
wildlife and suggested a name change for the 
division to refl ect the new philosophy. They 
recommended an amplifi ed research program 
focusing on species-specifi c and nonlethal 
methods. Suggestions on PARC operations 
included restricting the program in the western 
states. With regard to poisons, the Leopold 
scientists concluded that Compound 1080 was 
the most effi  cient method for control on the 
western range, and that when properly applied, 
it could be safe, humane, and eff ective. But, the 
scientists pointed out, abuse of Compound 
1080 did occur; they recommended increased 
federal controls over its use, as well as over 
the use of other predacides. The Leopold 
committ ee included a bit of political prescience 
in its report:
Unless the government control program 
undergoes a drastic and critical internal 
revision of operational objectives and 
procedures, an even more drastic revision 
will sooner or later be forced by the public, 
with possible curtailment of the control 
functions which we concur are locally 
important (Leopold et al. 1964:18).
Secretary Udall took the committ ee’s 
recommendations to heart. On 16 June 1965, 
aft er 15 months of deliberations and public 
comment, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior 
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announced the acceptance of the Leopold 
Report as a “general guidepost” for Interior 
Department policy (U.S. Congress 1966). He 
off ered assurances to wool growers that they 
would not be forgott en: “We have no intention 
of abandoning our responsibility in the control 
of damage by pest species when it is clear 
that the Department’s assistance is needed.” 
He added, however, that “[a]t the same time, 
the Department has a much wider interest in 
wildlife, including the general public interest” 
(J. H. Berryman, Wildlife Services Progress 
unpublished report 1969 [hereaft er referred to 
as Wildlife Services Progress 1969]).
Over the next 5 years, a spring cleaning of 
sorts occurred at the U.S. Department of the 
Interior’s predator control division. Policies, 
names, terms, titles, and philosophies were 
replaced or changed. Aff ected parties watched 
the debris fl ying from the closet with interest. 
“[Environmentalists] thought we were dragging 
our feet, wool growers thought we were 
going ape, and they really kept the pressure 
on,” remembers Jack H. Berryman, head of 
the government program at the time (J. H. 
Berryman, personal communication, 1996). 
Changes took place at 2 levels; the federal 
program received cosmetic surgery designed 
to improve public relations as well as deeper 
changes in philosophy and policy.
Everyone involved in the predator control 
house cleaning recognized the importance of 
public perception. A public outcry had spurred 
the Leopold Report and its recommendations 
in the fi rst place; the federal policy needed to 
respect this public concern. “We recommend that 
each step in implementing the [new predator 
control] policy be accompanied by news 
coverage to secure maximum understanding 
of the program and establish a new ‘image’” 
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969, Appendix 
3:5). Between 1965 and 1969, in an eff ort to 
win public support, the U.S. Department 
of the Interior circulated 250 pamphlets 
and off ered 73 formal talks in addition to 
routine newslett ers and announcements 
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969).
As a part of these changes, the federal 
predator control program received a 
new name and a new head in 1965. The 
U.S. Division of Predator and Rodent 
Control became the U.S. Division of 
Wildlife Services (DWS) to highlight the 
new direction of the federal program. 
New responsibilities included “Wildlife 
Enhance-ment” and “Pesticide Appraisal-
Monitoring,” both protection (as opposed 
to control) oriented functions. When Jack 
H. Berryman came aboard to head the DWS, a 
U.S. Department of the Interior news release 
emphasized that he had been an associate 
professor at Utah State University and that he 
had served as the immediate past president of 
The Wildlife Society. These changes refl ected 
the importance of public opinion and approval 
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969).
Berryman quickly began the makeover of the 
predator control program. Titles of DWS fi eld 
operatives changed from the sinister “Control 
Agents” to the innocuous “District Field 
Assistants” (National Archives, Record Group 
22, unpublished correspondence, August 24, 
1965). The Washington offi  ce recognized that 
“there is a need for upgrading the appearance 
of fi eld personnel” to overcome the image of 
predator control specialists as “gopher chokers” 
and “blood-thirsty killers”; DWS employees 
were issued fi eld uniforms and provided 
instruction on public relations (National 
Archives, Record Group 22, unpublished 
correspondence, August 27,  1965). Even the 
term-inology of control changed.
Obviously, public acceptance is essential 
if we are to continue to meet our animal 
control responsibilities. Much of the 
terminology that has been used over the 
years is for various reasons now distasteful 
to some segments of the public and there 
is a need for a careful review of verbal 
and writt en expressions. (unpublished 
correspondence, National Archives, Record 
Group 22, October 18, 1965)
“Poison” became “toxicant” or “chemical 
compound”; “kill” became “reduction” or 
“removal” (National Archives, Record Group 
22, unpublished correspondence, October 18, 
1965). Berryman instructed DWS operatives to 
stop thinking about animals as “good,” “bad,” 
Red fox cub. 
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“pests,” “detrimental,” and “benefi cial,” and 
instead recognize that all species, at 1 time 
or another, could fi t all of these descriptions 
(“Wildlife Services Progress” 1969, personal 
communication 1996).
Agents working for PARC had received 
criticism for being unprofessional and 
uneducated; Berryman professionalized the 
division. DWS recruited people trained in 
wildlife management. By 1969, 26 of 33 state 
supervisors had been replaced, and 80% of DWS 
personnel had college degrees—a signifi cant 
increase over earlier years (Wildlife Services 
Progress 1969).
The changes implemented by DWS between 
1965 and 1969 were not merely cosmetic. 
Progressive conservation had provided the 
ideology for predator control in the fi rst half 
of the twentieth century. This ideology had 
become less relevant, and the DWS needed 
to acknowledge this change. The agency 
transformed its guiding philosophy, always 
with an eye to public opinion.
This has been no simple reorganization or 
policy redirection. What has really been 
at stake is a fundamental change in the 
conservation movement—a change in the 
way we view and deal with animals that 
become troublesome. We are not dealing 
simply with a change in a Federal bureau, 
but a change in public att itudes among 
cooperators and cooperating agencies—
in att itudes that touch emotions and 
pocketbooks (Wildlife Services Progress 
1969:1).
The division adopted the Leopold Report’s 
guiding principles: all animals have a right 
to exist, but control is necessary in certain 
situations.
In April 1967, DWS translated its philosophy 
into a new policy titled “Man and Wildlife,” 
the fi rst offi  cial policy statement issued in the 
history of federal predator control. Division 
offi  cials took painstaking steps to ensure that 
their new policy met public approval (Wildlife 
Services Progress 1969). They circulated a 
draft  to 30 land-managing agencies, livestock 
associations, environmental groups, and 
others—“everybody and his brother,” according 
to Berryman—and incorporated virtually all of 
their comments and suggestions in the fi nal 
draft  (Wildlife Services Progress 1969, appendix 
11). Secretary Udall described the policy as “a 
fi rm resolve that in protecting the interest of 
man, we will not jeopardize the environment 
in which we must live” (National Archives, 
Record Group 22, unpublished correspondence, 
August 9, 1968). 
Practices changed in the fi eld, too. DWS agents 
decreased their use of poisons and traps, which 
led to a decrease in total take of animals. They 
increased the use of aircraft  and introduced 
mobile forces that could quickly respond to 
areas with serious predator problems. The 
division tried to increase control in high-sheep 
areas and halt it in nonsheep areas, hoping to 
increase coyote populations but keep the level 
of depredation constant (Wildlife Services 
Progress 1969).
Offi  cials at DWS also implemented stricter 
controls on the use of poisons, particularly 
Compound 1080. They reevaluated the 
placement of all bait stations and withdrew 
some of them from use. They sought formal 
approval of land users and district, state, and 
regional managers before sett ing out the sta-
tions. From 1965 to 1969, the use of Compound 
1080 baits declined 21%, strychnine use fell 22%, 
and use of thallium sulfate (perhaps the most 
dangerous and nonselective of the predacides 
then employed) was virtually eliminated 
(Wildlife Services Progress 1969).
The battle for public opinion
For all the commotion at DWS between 
1965 and 1969, the changes failed. Although 
signifi cant advances had been made both in 
Washington and in the fi eld, the new policy 
faltered because it did not win public support. 
Criticism of the program died down for a few 
years, but by the late 1960s, environmentalists 
were criticizing DWS and its predator control 
program as never before. Environmentalists, 
DWS agents, and wool growers struggled 
over a variety of concerns: poison use, wool 
grower infl uence on policy, the conservation/
preservation debate, and animal welfare. In 
short, the issues that had been simmering for 
the previous 50 years boiled over.
A dramatic increase in the American public’s 
environmental awareness set up the next 
round of predator control debates. Between 
1969 and 1971, concern for the environment 
burst upon the national scene. A survey of 
editorials conducted in September 1971 in 5 
major newspapers found that the environment 
was the most important domestic issue. The 
new awareness found expression in April 1970 
with the celebration of Earth Day. Hundreds of 
thousands of people paraded along the streets 
of Washington, D.C., New York, and other 
cities, demanding a more responsible approach 
to nature. College campuses also emerged as 
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centers of protest (Spencer 1972, Whitaker 1976, 
Steinberg 2002).
Interest in predator control rose with these 
larger movements, but the new protests 
diff ered from previous complaints. For the fi rst 
time, critics of the program were able to carry 
their message to the general public outside the 
memberships of environmental organizations. 
In 1969, for example, NBC aired a prime-time 
documentary titled “The Wolf Me” that was 
viewed by 40 million people. The documentary 
detailed the practice of bounty hunting for 
wolves in Alaska and included grisly scenes of 
hunters eating raw wolf fl esh. One author in 
Defenders of Wildlife News wrote:
The spectacle of that pot-bellied, waffl  e-
bott omed, all-American sportsman with his 
twelve-gauge automatic shotgun, maiming, 
crippling, and sometimes killing outright 
the harmless, family-oriented wolves in 
deep snow from a hovering helicopter, 
boiled the collective blood of millions of 
Americans... (Murray 1972:251).
Over 1,600 lett ers of protest poured in to 
DWS offi  ces and 700 more to the offi  ce of the 
governor of Alaska concerning the predator 
control program as well as Alaskan wolf 
hunting (National Archives, Record Group 
22, unpublished correspondence, February 6, 
1970). In June 1970, the New Yorker published a 
40-page article detailing the eff ects of the DWS 
prairie dog control program on the endangered 
black-footed ferret (Mustela nigripes). Prairie 
dog control relied on Compound 1080, 
which the author Faith McNulty labeled “a 
Hiroshima-like disaster” (McNulty 1970). In 
1971, McNulty published a book detailing the 
situation. Environmentalists had succeeded 
in broadcasting their concerns about predator 
control and Compound 1080 in the popular 
media.
Supporters of the predator control program 
claimed that the wolf-eating scenes were 
staged. The hunter fi lmed eating wolf meat in 
“The Wolf Men” insisted that the whole incident 
was a joke; he had been hamming it up for the 
cameras. The documentary had played on the 
emotions of uninformed viewers, “almost all of 
whom have grown up with a Bambi complex 
about wild game—naturally the scenes 
provoked an angry protest against hunting 
wolves” (National Wool Grower 1971:6). These 
att empted rebutt als did litt le to stem the lett ers 
of protest that poured into the DWS offi  ce in 
Washington, D.C. (J. H. Berryman, personal 
communication, September 25, 1996). 
The barrage of negative press for predator 
control continued. In March 1971, the journalist 
Jack Olsen published a series of incendiary 
articles collectively titled “The Poisoning of the 
West” in the widely read sports weekly, Sports 
Illustrated. Olsen voiced loud concerns about 
the DWS coyote control program:
“Were all these [animal] deaths necessary? 
Were they ecologically justifi ed? Or were they 
part of a runaway killing program that years ago 
lost its scientifi c justifi cation and now rushes on 
like an unbraked train?” (Olsen 1971b:37)
Poison, Olsen coldly explained, “is turning 
the tortured rangelands into a reeking abatt oir 
of dead and dying wildlife and contaminated 
watersheds.” Olsen att acked the ranchers and 
the DWS:
Unless there are massive changes, unless 
the livestock lobbies of the West and the 
federal poisoners give up their myths 
and prejudices, the day must come when 
the last weak and sickened coyote will 
drag himself to his feet and lift  his voice 
to the skies, and there will be no answer 
(1971b:37). 
By publishing in Sports Illustrated, Olsen 
reached a group of readers not necessarily 
associated with the environmental movement. 
Later in 1971, Olsen expanded his exposé 
into a book provocatively entitled Slaughter 
the Animals, Poison the Earth. This diff ered 
litt le in substance from the articles, although 
it presented the accusations in greater detail 
(Olsen 1971a). Slaughter the Animals received 
positive reviews in the mainstream press. 
Indeed, some compared it to Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring (Amory 1971).
Olsen and other protesters tapped into the 
widespread public awareness of ecology. They 
argued that no scientifi c studies had proven the 
wool growers’ claims about the threat predators 
posed to sheep and lambs, suggesting instead 
that coyotes preferred rabbits, mice, and other 
Fox stalking at night.
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forest rodents (Callison 1971, Free 1971). The 
protesters pointed repeatedly to the fi ndings of 
the Leopold Report to uphold their position. 
If Leopold and the other scientists 
are correct—if the land is indeed one 
organism and there is a total and critical 
interdependence among all living 
things—then the deliberate poisoning of 
vast areas of the United States will have 
been a long stride toward the end of life 
as it is known on the North American 
continent (Olsen 1971a:33).
Environmentalists used the science of ecology 
to support their criticisms of predator control in 
a way that would not have been possible earlier 
in the century (Dunlap 1983). 
Animal welfare activists jumped into the fray, 
turning up the pressure for change in predator 
programs. Cleveland Amory, president of the 
anticruelty organization Fund for Animals, 
explained: 
We do not feel we can give every animal 
on this earth a decent life, but we do 
feel the least we can do in an age when 
we can get to the moon is give them a 
decent death. Now we are going to rule 
out certain kinds of death as indecent .... 
Poisoning is an indecent death to a wild 
animal .... [I]f we could show on television 
a coyote dying of thallium or 1080 ... we 
would eventually get poison outlawed 
for good (U.S. Congress 1971:178–179).
Animal welfare activists accepted the 
necessity for control, but wanted it done in a 
humane manner. 
To capture the support of the wider public, 
environmentalists pointed out that tax money 
funded the interests of a very small number of 
ranchers. The question of federal responsibility 
for wildlife management became an important 
part of such criticisms. “Remember, since most 
of it is public land, and your taxes pay the 
poisoners, what they’re doing is poisoning 
your animals on your land with your money” 
(Amory 1971:20). Ranchers corralled tax dollars 
for such self-serving programs, critics argued, 
because livestock interests had too much power 
over western legislatures and federal agencies. 
Environmentalists fi ngered DWS as a guilty 
party. “No Federal agency can possibly be 
more abject in its ‘clientism’ to special economic 
interests than [DWS] in dealing with the sheep 
industry” (Frome 1971:44). Environmentalists 
hoped that pocketbook arguments would 
lead to wider support for their demands for 
drastic change in the federal predator control 
program. 
Opponents of the program asked the 
American public to depart from their traditional 
ideas about nature. They wanted to leave the 
older ideas of conservation behind and view the 
environment in “ethical rather than economic 
terms” (Nash 1982:254). In this new way of 
thinking, considerations for animal suff ering 
and the web of life took precedence over food 
production and economic effi  ciency. But not all 
Americans embraced this new perspective.
The wool growers had diffi  culty batt ling 
environmentalists for the support of the general 
public. “All we have to do is get the story out .... 
The people we must reach are the consumers 
of America, and they’re out there right now 
listening to propaganda from the other side” 
(Shepard 1971:16). Despite their best att empts, 
however, the wool growers failed. They asked 
NBC for the opportunity to run an equal-time 
documentary to respond to the accusations 
leveled against them in “The Wolf Men”; NBC 
rebuff ed them (National Wool Grower 1970). 
They tried to write articles in response to Olsen’s 
allegations but could not get one published 
in a periodical with wide circulation (Utah 
Wool Growers Association papers, Merrill 
Library, Utah State University, unpublished 
correspondence, 1971). With no place else to 
go, the stockmen made their arguments in 
association publications, in farming tabloids, 
and in the local newspapers of western towns. 
If New Yorkers could not read these articles, the 
wool growers would reach out to the people of 
the rural West.
The rural populace resented urban inter-
ference. The environmentalists’ calls for a ban 
on poison use seemed another example of an all-
too-familiar patt ern. Just as ecologists presumed 
all ranchers were ignorant of modern science, 
wool growers stereotyped environmentalists 
as New York urbanites unfamiliar with a hard 
day’s work or with the necessities of agriculture. 
The sheepmen invited “all those who have 
never experienced the harshness of agricultural 
production to learn the ranchers’ and farmers’ 
side of the story before they promote ‘im-
practical schemes’ to correct the ill[s] of food 
and fi ber production” (Johnson 1971:19–20). 
Having more sympathy for coyotes than for 
sheep seemed not only fi nancially unwise, 
but simply ludicrous. The stockmen viewed 
coyote depredations as the rural equivalent to 
the inner-city subway mugging. City dwellers 
had policemen for protection; why should 
sheepmen be defenseless (Stoddard 1971)?
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Ranchers also resented being cast as people 
ignorant in the ways of nature. Ranchers 
believed that environmentalists exaggerated 
the risks of ecological disaster from predator 
control. And, the sheepmen asked, who knew 
the environment bett er than the people who 
worked on the range? Certainly not a bunch of 
New Yorkers.
The wool grower’s basic business deals 
with sustaining life. To survive he must 
understand and cooperate with the forces 
of nature. He spends more time in the 
wilderness observing the interactions of 
nature in one year than most people spend 
in a lifetime (Noh 1970:25).
Ranchers could do a bett er job “maintaining 
the environment than all the fl y-by-night 
campaigns to ‘restore nature’s balance’—
whatever that precisely is” (Armstrong 
1971:12).
Ranchers wanted to use economics, not 
ecology, to determine control, as they had 
been doing for most of the century. The wool 
growers relied on statistics, like the number of 
sheep lost each year to predator depredation, to 
justify control. The predator control program 
had functioned for years without a formalized 
reporting system. Environmentalists continually 
accused the ranchers of infl ating their losses—
“crying coyote”—to garner federal support (New 
York Times 1972). DWS had implemented a 
documentation system during the post-Leopold 
Report make-over, and stockmen’s magazines 
urged ranchers to report their losses. “On fi le 
with the proper [offi  ce], the record becomes a 
matt er of statistics, compiled by the agency that 
will assist us in case of adverse legislation or of 
support with favorable legislation on predator 
control” (Utah Wool Grower 1971:1).
The wool growers utilized such statistics, as 
well as the economic costs of predator losses, 
in the same manner that the environmentalists 
used ecology. They argued that impartial, 
uncontestable science supported their claims. 
They tried to quantify the dollars lost each 
year to predators. One frequently-cited study 
placed the fi gure at $3 million for Utah alone 
(Nielson and Curle 1970). Wool growers 
believed they could not raise sheep without 
the assistance of a federal predator control 
program, and they feared for the future of 
their industry. The declining numbers of sheep 
ranchers across the nation reinforced this 
concern. Vern Vivion, president of the National 
Wool Growers Association, worried that “the 
predator problem throughout the nation is so 
serious it could be the straw that breaks our 
backs” (Parker 1972:22).
Ranchers viewed poisons as a vital tool 
for the health of their industry. They grew 
particularly frustrated with the outcry over 
Compound 1080. They regarded it as their most 
eff ective technique and credited it with saving 
the American sheep industry from extinction. 
“In spite of 1080’s poor reputation with the 
public, much of this is based on misinformation 
or deliberate distortion of its characteristics, it 
... is a chemical which could be used selectively 
for control of coyotes ....” (Cummings 1971:22). 
The wool growers felt the occasional nontarget 
death a small price to pay for the continued 
viability of their industry and their way of life 
(National Wool Grower 1972).
Two sets of att itudes about wild lands 
and wildlife came into contest over predator 
control policies, and specifi cally over the use 
of Compound 1080. Ranchers, “committ ed 
to making the land productive,” viewed 
Compound 1080 as an economic technology 
(Dunlap 1988:112). Preservationists pointed to 
Compound 1080 as an example of “reckless 
disregard for the material world on which we 
[depend]” (Dunlap 1988:112). Predator control 
became such a volatile issue in part because of 
the clash in values. The tremendous growth 
of environmental awareness in the late 1960s 
forced the confl ict of values out into the open. 
The fact that predator control divided so neatly 
along batt le lines already drawn between the 
East and the West and between urban and rural 
America stoked the fi re. Divergent opinions 
on predator control exacerbated preexisting 
notions of ignorant, backwoods ranchers and 
emotional, urban environmentalists. 
Conclusion: changes in the federal 
predator control policy
In the end, the wool growers lost the batt le for 
public perception of predator control, and the 
predictions made in the Leopold Report about 
drastic change proved prophetic. Another 
public relations disaster—the 1971 discovery 
by a Boy Scout troop of 24 eagle carcasses 
near a poisoned bait station in Wyoming—
brought intense public scrutiny on the federal 
program (Schueler 1991). Congressional 
hearings followed, as did lawsuits brought 
by environmental groups in an att empt to 
stop the use of predacides. In July 1971, U.S. 
Department of the Interior Secretary Rogers 
Morton announced that a new committ ee (the 
Cain Committ ee, named aft er chairman Stanley 
A. Cain and including A. Starker Leopold, 4 
other biologists and a political scientist) would 
investigate the use of poisons and analyze the 
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progress made by the DWS in implementing 
the recommendations of the Leopold Report 
(Cain et al. 1972, Feldman 1996). 
Just as the Cain Committ ee released its report 
in February 1972, President Richard Nixon 
issued an executive order banning the use of 
predacides on public lands. Nixon explained his 
order as a political decision—based on changing 
values—as much as a scientifi c one. “Americans 
today set high value on the preservation of 
wildlife,” Nixon explained. “The old notion 
that the only good predator is a dead one is no 
longer acceptable as we understand that even 
the animals and birds have their own value in 
maintaining the balance of nature” (Council on 
Environmental Quality 1972:365).
Although the changes put in place in the 
aft ermath of the Leopold Report had updated 
the philosophy behind the federal predator 
control program, these reforms had failed to 
win support for the program from the wider 
public. Environmentalists succeeded in gett ing 
their critique of the federal predator control 
program into the mainstream, while ranchers 
had not been able to mount a successful 
defense of this practice. This failure had grave 
consequences: the ranchers were shut out of 
the policy-making process. President Nixon 
responded to the source of public pressure that 
pushed the hardest. Public opinion, as much as 
science, had determined the shape of federal 
predator control policy.
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